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Abstract
This study examines how the duration of patent examination is affected by technological
diversity of patent applications, using a sample of all pharmaceutical patent applications
filed between 1985 and 2017 at State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO). Patent
examination is a crucial process to evaluate the patentability of technological inventions. To
understand what factors influence patent examination duration can offer strategic insights
for both patent applicants and patent system designers. Although China has been leading
the world’s patent applications since 2011, it is surprising that little research has been
conducted on the process of patent examination in China. This thesis takes a step to fill
this gap.
This study complements prior research (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Tong et al., 2018)
by zooming into the effect of technological diversity, which is one of the most important
characteristics of patent applications. Competing risks hazard rate models show an inverted
U-shaped relationship between patent applications’ technological diversity and the rates of
decisions of both grant and rejection. It means that when a patent application combines
technological elements with a moderate level of diversity, it will facilitate the assigned
patent examiner to make the decision faster, whether it is grant or rejection. In addition,
it is also found that the effect of technological diversity on the rate of grant, but not the
rate of rejection, is significantly weakened for applications with more than 10 claims. A
discussion of these findings and their implications is included at the end of the thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Question
The patent system is a complex system that aims to provide monopoly rights of a
limited time to inventors and to protect the patent rights from infringement yet requires
a detailed public disclosure of an invention. In recent years, there has been a fast growth
of patent applications all over the world. According to a recent report from the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), approximately 3,127,900 patent applications
were filed worldwide in 2016, compared to 2,888,800 in 2015 and 2,680,900 in 2014 (WIPO,
2017). The five largest patent offices, which are the State Intellectual Property Office of
China (SIPO)1 , United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Japanese Patent
Office (JPO), Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) and European Patent Office
(EPO) accounted for 84 % of the total patent filings all over the world. Notably, SIPO has
been receiving the highest number of patent applications since 2011, and the fast growth
1Since August 28th, 2018, SIPO changed its name into China Intellectual Property Administration
(CNIPA). This study was completed prior to this date, and all the data and information we collected were
published by SIPO, thus, we use SIPO in the thesis as abbreviation of the State Intellectual Property
Office of China.
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of patent applications filed in China has made SIPO the largest patent office in the world
(see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: The Trend in Patent Applications at the Top Five Patent Offices (2011 - 2016)2
There has been an increasing number of studies that try to explain the recent upsurge
of Chinese patenting (Hu and Jefferson, 2009; Li, 2012). However, not much research has
paid attention to the process of patent examination and the resulting decisions, especially
the decisions other than grant. Tong et al. (2018) is one exception. They replicated Harhoff
and Wagner (2009)’s research on EPO applications in China. Using a dataset that covers
the invention patent applications ranging from 1993 to 2006 at SIPO, they examined the
effects of characteristics of applicants, applications, and environment on the pendencies
for the three outcomes following the patent examination process grant, rejection and
withdrawal, respectively. In general, they replicated many findings reported in Harhoff
and Wagner (2009) and confirmed that many factors have different effects on pendencies
for different outcomes. In addition, they also highlighted the differences across the two
patent offices.
2Source: http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/. Last visited October 25th, 2018.
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While the above two studies have provided us with an overview of what can affect the
durations leading to different outcomes of patent examination, we still do not have a clear
understanding of how and why certain characteristics of patent applications influence the
pendencies of outcomes. We aim to fill this gap in this study. Specifically, we focus on
technological diversity of patent applications, and analyze how it affects the duration of
patent examination that leads to either grant or rejection.
Prior research shows that there is a non-linear relationship between firm-level technolog-
ical diversity and innovation performance. Firms with a moderate level of the technological
diversity achieve the highest innovation performance in terms of number and usefulness
(or impact) of granted patents (Dindarog˘lu, 2017; Huang and Chen, 2010; Strumsky and
Lobo, 2015). At the patent level, how does a patent application’s technological diversity
affect its examination outcome? So far, we do not have a clear answer to this question.
This study aims to answer this question, by using hazard rate models to analyze all patent
applications in the field of pharmaceuticals in SIPO from 1985, the year when the Chinese
patent system was established, to the end of 2017.
1.2 Motivations
Understanding the patent examination process has great strategic implications for ap-
plicants (Jell, 2011), who rely on protected patent rights to recoup the costs of inventing
and of patent examination and maintenance, and to gain further benefits from it. For ex-
ample, Gans et al. (2008) find that applicants sometimes would delay patent examination
process to create the uncertainty for winning bargaining power for future patent licensing
and assignment. The higher uncertainty level, the greater bargaining power. Being able to
predict the patent examination outcomes and influence the examination duration is there-
fore essential for applicants to manage their patenting activities. We are motivated by this
purpose and develop our research on how patent factors affect examination outcomes.
Patenting rules and requirements are different across countries, so are the patent ex-
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amination systems. Previous research always focuses on the U.S. (Xie and Giles, 2011;
Carley et al., 2015) and European patent systems (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Harhoff
and Wagner, 2009). Since SIPO has become the world’s largest patent office since 2011 due
to the highest patent application volume, it attracts researchers to take a close look at the
Chinese system. However, not much research has paid attention to the patent examination
outcomes, especially the rate of each examination outcome. Therefore, our research tries
to fill in the research gap.
1.3 Contributions
This study has at least two contributions. First, we focus on the relationship between
patent applications’ technological diversity and the duration of examination. Even though
prior research has examined various attributes of patent applications and the pendency
for various examination outcomes (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Tong et al., 2018), no one
has yet paid attention to the effect of patent technological diversity, which is one of the
most important characteristics of patent applications. Using hazard rate model, we find
an inverted U-shaped relationship between patent technological diversity and the rates
of decisions of both grant and rejection. It means that when a patent application has a
moderate level of technological diversity, it will facilitate the assigned patent examiner to
make the decision faster, regardless if it is grant or rejection. In addition, we examine the
moderating effect of the number of claims and find that the effect of technological diversity
on the rates of decisions is weaker for the applications with more than 10 claims than those
with less than 10 claims.
Second, our methodology is more rigorous in two aspects. The first one is that we define
our risk set more rigorously. Prior research assumes that all patent applications enter the
risk set automatically when they are filed (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Tong et al., 2018).
However, this is not accurate, because only applications that have entered the stage of
substantive review can receive examiners decision of grant or rejection. Applications do
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not enter substantive review automatically. Applicants must make the request within three
years since the filing date, otherwise, their applications will be regarded as withdrawn.
Therefore, we only include those applications that have entered substantive examination
into our analysis, because only those applications can possibly receive an examination
decision. Secondly, we use competing risks hazard rate models (Fine and Gray, 1999)
to analyze the rates of all three possible patent examination outcomes, such as, grant,
rejection, and withdrawal (applicants can still decide to withdraw their applications after
they request substantive examination), simultaneously, even though we are only interested
in decisions of grant and rejection. Traditional survival analysis encodes objects that
have experienced non-interested events as right-censored cases, which are equivalent to the
pending cases that remain in the risk set. This can potentially lead to biases. Competing
risks models, however, compute hazard rates by excluding the cases that have experienced
non-interested events from the risk set. Therefore, the results are less likely to be subject
to biases.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is structured as following. Chapter 2 introduces the background
of Chinese patent system, including the evolution of patent legal system and the patent
examination process. Chapter 3 provides a literature review on related topics, based on
which we develop our hypotheses on the impact of patent technological diversity on the
rates of examination decisions, as well as on the moderating effect of claims. Chapter 4
describes our data and the methods we use to test our hypotheses. Chapter 5 shows the
results of our empirical analysis. And finally, Chapter 6 summarises the main findings of
the thesis with a discussion on the limitations and directions of future research.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
The concept of patent system can usually have narrow and broad meanings. The
narrow meaning of patent system stays at an administrative level, which refers to the
examination process and the outcomes of patent applications. The broad meaning of
patent system includes both the patent legal system and the patent examination system
established following the law. In this chapter, we will introduce the patent system of China
in the broad sense (Yasong and Connor, 2008), including the Patent Law and the patent
administration SIPO.
2.1 Patent Legal System of China
In June 1980, the Chinese government rode the wave of reform and became a member
of the WIPO. To better connect with other WIPO members, China started to establish
its modern patent system since the 1980s. In March 1984 the Patent Law of the Peoples
Republic of China (PRC) was enacted during the Sixth National Peoples Congress. The
new patent law went into effect on April 1st, 1985 aiming to protect patent rights, encourage
invention-creations and promote the development of science and technology. As time passes
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by, the Patent Law of China has been amended three times in 1992, 2000 and 2008,
respectively, and is still in use nowadays.
2.1.1 The Founding of the Patent Law System of China
The first version of the patent law set the foundation for the patent system of China,
including the patent application and examination procedures, patent authorization condi-
tions, and regulations for patent right protection. There are three kinds of patents defined
in the first version of the patent law, which are inventions, utility models and designs
3. According to the Patent Law, any technology can be patented, including a product,
a process or an improvement of a product or a process, except for the following seven
things, including 1) scientific discoveries, 2) rules and methods for intellectual activities,
3) methods for diagnoses or treatments of diseases, 4) foods, beverages and condiments,
5) pharmaceutical products and substances obtained by means of a chemical process, 6)
animal and plant varieties, and 7) substances obtained by means of nuclear fission4 (Article
25, Patent Law of China, 19855). It is noteworthy that although pharmaceutical products
could not be patented from 1985 to 1992, the process of manufacturing pharmaceutical
products could during this time. As a result, we can still observe some patent applications
in the category of pharmaceutical technology.
The first version of the Patent Law of China stipulated the conditions for granting
3According to the Rules for the Implementation of the Patent Law of the Peoples Republic of China,
Article 1: Invention patents means technical solution relating to a product, a process or an improvement
thereof. Utility model refers to any new technical solution relating to a product’s shape, structure, or
a combination thereof, which is fit for practical use. And design patent represents the new design of a
product’s shape, pattern or a combination thereof, as well as its combination with the colour and the shape
or pattern of a product, which creates an aesthetic feeling and is fit for industrial application.
4Source: http://iprchina.blogspot.com/. Last visited August 20th, 2018.
5Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (1985): http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.
aspx?id=38&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%d7%a8%c0%fb%b7%a8. Last visited July 25th,
2018.
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patents. According to the law, an application can be granted patent right only if it is
characterized by novelty, inventiveness, and practical applicability. Novelty means that
the patented technology must be a new technological solution which has never shown up in
domestic or foreign publications, known to the public or been filed with the Chinese Patent
Office before the filing date. Inventiveness means that the invention has substantively
distinguishing features and represents a significant improvement compared with the extant
technologies. And practical applicability of a patent means that the invention can be
manufactured, is usable, and can produce positive results (Article 22, Patent Law of China,
1985). Applications that do not conform to these three requirements, even after being given
the opportunity to be revised, will be rejected (Article 38, 42, 43, Patent Law of China
1985).
In addition to outlining the requirements for granting, this version of the Patent Law
also stipulated that applicants can withdraw an application at any time before the patent
right is granted (Article 32, Patent Law of China, 1985). Applications can be deemed to
have been withdrawn if applicants do not respond promptly and effectively to the require-
ments of the patent office, for instance, when an applicant does not submit the required
documents in time or fails to respond to the patent examiners’ amendment requests within
the time limit (Article 35, 36, 37, 41, Patent Law of China, 1985).
The first version of Patent Law of China laid a solid foundation for its subsequent
development. It not only established the patent system in China, but also regulated the
specific principles for the implementation of the law, such as examination and approval of
patent applications, a compulsory license for exploitation of a patent, and protection of
the patent rights.
2.1.2 The First Amendment of the Patent Law of China
In September 1992, China revised the Patent law in order to accept more international
patent applications and to join the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). The amendment
became effective on January 1st, 1993. One year later, in January 1994, China signed the
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PCT to become a contracting country. PCT is an international patent law treaty, which
outlines a set of unified procedures for filing patent applications and protecting patented
technologies in each of its contracting countries. A PCT application is first filed at a
receiving office; after an international searching for prior art and an optional preliminary
examination, the application will then enter into the initial national application phase of
the desired countries and regions.
According to the PCT requirements, China revised the national patent law and con-
ferred a 12-month priority right on both international and domestic applications. For
international applications, within 12 months from the date on which any invention patent
is first filed in a foreign country, the same patent application enjoys a priory right in China.
Similarly, for domestic patent applications, within 12 months from the date on which any
invention patent is first filed in China, the same patent application enjoys a domestic
priority right (Article 29, Patent Law of China, 19936).
The first amendment added pharmaceutical products as patentable technology (Article
25, Patent Law of China, 1993). Thus, since 1993, both pharmaceutical products and its
manufacturing processes have been patentable. The change tripled the number of patent
applications in pharmaceutical, from 576 in 1992 to 1755 in 1993.
Compare to the first version of the Patent Law of China, the first amendment improved
in many important aspects that further encouraged innovation. For instance, it increased
the term of invention patent protection from 15 years to 20 years; it also added domestic
patent priority right based on international priority right; and it allowed pharmaceutical
products to be patented. If the period from 1985 to 1992 right after the establishment of
the Patent Law of China system was considered as an exploratory time for Chinese patent
system, then the second period from 1993 to mid 2001 offered a better developed legal
environment for both foreign and domestic inventors.
6Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (1992 Amendment): http://www.lawinfochina.com/
display.aspx?id=290&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%d7%a8%c0%fb%b7%a8. Last visited
July 25th, 2018.
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2.1.3 The Second Amendment of the Patent Law of China
Like the first amendment, which prepared China to join the PCT, the second amend-
ment of the Patent Law of China was also closely related to an important move of China.
In December 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), and a series of
legal regulations were subsequently amended to fulfill WTO’s requirements, including the
Patent Law. The second amendment of Patent Law of China was initiated in August
2000 and went into effect on July 1st 2001. In order to comply with WTO’s require-
ments, especially those outlined in the Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), the third version of the Patent Law of China included more reg-
ulations related to importing and exporting patented products. These regulations raised
the threshold of infringements in China for imported patents. For instance, anyone uses or
sells a non-Chinese patented product in China will not be deemed as patent right infringe-
ment if the product was made or imported with the permission of the patentee (Article
63, Patent Law of China, 20017). Such a friendly patent legal environment has attracted
many patent applications from foreign countries and encouraged trading between China
and other countries since 2001.
Another update of this version is the addition of provincial patent offices responsibilities
of managing disputes over patent rights. As the patent system got increasingly mature,
hundreds of thousands of patent applicants had been flooding into SIPO (formerly Na-
tional Patent Office, renamed in 1998). This drastically increased the workload of the
Office. Consequently, in the second amendment, in order to relieve the Office’s workload
and help it focus on examining patent applications more efficiently, the responsibilities of
managing disputes over patent rights was delegated to the provincial patent administrative
departments with the general guidance of the Intellectual Property Office of China (Article
3, Patent Law of China, 2001; Chapter 7, Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of
China, 2002).
7Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (2000 Amendment): http://www.lawinfochina.com/
display.aspx?id=4983&lib=law. Last visited July 25th, 2018.
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2.1.4 The Third Amendment of the Patent Law of China
The third amendment of the Patent Law of China was initiated in December 2008 and
went into effect on October 1st 2009. This version is still in force. In this version, for the
first time, it is confirmed the connection between the protection of intellectual property
rights and economic development (Article 1, Patent Law of China, 20098). Thus, in this
version, the distribution of profits between co-applicants is stipulated in more detail. In
addition, the fine for patent right infringement is increased from 50,000 RMB Yuan into
one million RMB Yuan. This change aggravates the penalties for patent right infringement
and increases the value of patent right as well.
Meanwhile, the standards for granting a patent also become stricter according to the
current version of the Patent Law. This version defines the three criteria for granting a
patent – novelty, inventiveness and practical applicability – in more detail. Moreover, the
evaluation of any patent application should be based on the comparison against an existing
technology, not only known in China, but also known outside China (Article 20, Patent
Law of China, 2009). These changes significantly increase the difficulties of being granted
patent rights in China.
After years of development, the Patent System of China has become increasingly de-
veloped and transparent. The establishment of the first three Intellectual Property (IP)
Courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou in 2014 indicates that the Patent System of
China has gone into a new era. The specialized IP courts aim to improve the quality of
judgments related to IP rights by giving quicker and better decisions on IP infringement
cases than general courts (such as, civilian courts). The fourth amendment of Patent
Law was initiated in 2014, and it is still pending. Considering the short history of the
Patent System of China for only 33 years (1985 – 2018), its integrality and the degree of
internationalization are very impressive.
8Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (2008 Amendment): http://www.lawinfochina.com/
display.aspx?id=7289&lib=law. Last visited July 25th, 2018.
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2.2 International Patent Applications
Because of the development of Patent System of China, more and more international
applicants file their patents in China. International applicants seeking patent protection
in China can choose to file applications through either Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)
route or Paris Convention route. China joined the PCT in 1994, and before then SIPO
accepted international patent applications through only Paris Convention route. Paris
Convention allows applicants to file patent applications in any of the 177 Paris Convention
contracting member countries within 12 months after the same application is filed in a
local member country. Figure 2.1 shows the application process through Paris Convention
route.
Figure 2.1: Patent Application through Paris Convention Route9
Figure 2.2: PCT Application Procedures 10
9Source: http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/faqs/faqs.html. Last visited October 9th, 2018.
10Source: http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/faqs/faqs.html. Last visited July 25th, 2018.
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Compare with the Paris Convention, PCT is more convenient if an applicant is seek-
ing patent rights simultaneously in multiple foreign countries. A PCT application goes
through the following process. The applicant first files an application with a local patent
office in one of the PCT member countries. Within the next 12 months, the applicant
should file the international application with WIPO, which is the PCT receiving office.
Within 16 months after the first filing date, a worldwide patent office called ”International
Search Authority” will issue an international search report with a written opinion on the
potential patentability of the application. Within 18 months after the first filing date, the
application will be published. Next, the applicant can request for an international prelim-
inary examination which will result in a report on the application’s patentability, but this
step is optional. Within 30 months after the first filing date, the application will enter into
the national phase in the desired countries. Figure 2.2 shows the complete process of the
PCT application described above.
2.3 Patent Examination Process
According to the Patent Law of China, the patent administrative department under the
State Council, namely, SIPO is responsible for carrying out the examination of all patent
applications. SIPO was founded in 1980 as the National Patent office, and was renamed
in 1998. It is responsible for patent related work and for the coordination with foreign
countries in the field of intellectual property.
As aforementioned, there are three kinds of patents in China, invention patents, utility
patents and design patents. Among the three kinds of patents, the examination of inven-
tion patents takes most resources. While the other two kinds only require a preliminary
examination, invention patent applications need to go through both a preliminary and a
substantive examination. In this thesis, we will only focus on invention patent applications.
The process of examining invention patent applications will be introduced in the following
sections.
13
2.3.1 Preliminary Examination of Invention Patent Application
The preliminary examination is a procedure that automatically starts after an inven-
tion patent application is received at SIPO. Once the application passes the preliminary
examination, it will be published. The main purposes of the preliminary examination are
two folded. First, it checks whether an application is complete and fulfills all the formal
requirements outlined by the Patent Law and its Implementation Regulations. Second,
it classifies patent applications into relevant technology domain(s) and assigns them to
examiners accordingly.
There are few things of a patent application that need to be checked during the pre-
liminary examination. First, a patent application will be checked whether its main and
related documents are submitted in conformity with the Patent Law of China and its Im-
plementing Regulation. Second, if additional documents are requested, whether they have
been submitted by the specified deadline. Finally, it will also be checked whether all the
fees incurred have been paid on time.
After making sure all the formal requirements of a patent application are fulfilled,
SIPO will categorize the application into certain technology domain(s) and assign it to
examiners accordingly. SIPO uses International Patent Classification (IPC) to classify
patent applications. IPC is an internationally accepted classification system for patent
documents. It is a useful search tool for accessing to the technological and legal information
contained in each patent. Moreover, it also serves as a basis for the industrial property
statistics which permits the assessment of technological development in various areas. The
format of IPC code is divided into five parts: Section, Class, Subclass, Main Group and
Subgroup. This format indicates a hierarchical system of categorization in which each level
is nested into another. Figure 2.3 shows the structure of the consistent of IPC code.
Table 2.1 shows the structure of an example of IPC code of A61K 6/05. A patent
that is assigned this IPC code belongs to the domain A – Human Necessities – in general.
Within the domain of Human Necessities, it belongs to the class of Medical or Veterinary
Science; Hygiene, indicated by two digits 61. Its subclass, indicated by the letter K,
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Figure 2.3: The Structure of IPC code
is Preparations for Medical, Dental, or Toilet Purposes. More specifically, within this
subclass, it is categorized into the main group of Preparations for Dentistry, indicated by
6/00 (all main group level codes end with /00), and finally into the subgroup of Amalgams,
indicated by 6/05.
Table 2.1: An IPC Layout Example for A61K 6/05
When assigning IPC code to a patent application, an examiner first assigns the patent
a main IPC code which most adequately represents the invention information. Invention
information includes the claims the applicant makes that define the range of protection,
description of the technology filed for being patented and figures that illustrate the tech-
nology. It is basically the information that delineates the contributions of the current
filed patent application built on prior art. A patent application can be assigned with
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multiple IPC codes if the application contains invention information that covers different
technological domains at various levels (i.e., Section, Class, or Subclass, and so on).
After conducting the preliminary examination, SIPO will disclose patent applications
that have not requested to be kept confidential. The publication date is usually 18 months
after the filing date, which is a statutory period regulated by the Patent Law of China.
Applicants may request an early publication for free to disclose the application earlier than
18 months after the application is filed.
2.3.2 Substantive Examination of Invention Patent Application
Within three years after filing a patent application, the applicant may request a sub-
stantive examination. During the substantive examination period, an application will be
judged from the three aspects – novelty, inventiveness and practical applicability – of a
qualified patent outlined in the Patent Law. At the end, a decision of granting or rejecting
will be reached. The substantive examination is mostly initiated by applicants’ request. If
an applicant fails to submit the request within the first three years after filing the appli-
cation, the application will be considered as withdrawn. However, SIPO may also initiate
the substantive examination process for an invention patent application when it is deemed
necessary (Article 35, Patent Law of China, 1985, 1992, 2000, 2008). The time that the
substantive examination process takes varies, depending on the nature of the patent appli-
cations. The substantive examination fee for applications filed through PCT (with prior
international search) is RMB 1200 Yuan, and RMB 2500 Yuan for the rest (with no prior
international search).
Once the substantive examination process for a patent application starts, the examiner
needs to review whether the application fulfills all the requirements for novelty, inventive-
ness and practical applicability. The examiner will first search prior art related to the
application. China adopts the ’first-to-file’ system, which means whoever files a patent
application for an invention first will be considered as the potential owner of its patent
right, regardless of the date of actual invention. A patent application is considered as
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novel if there has no similar technology filed as patent before the filing date of the current
application.
Before examiners start to search for prior art, they first need to double check the as-
signment of IPC code(s) to the applications during the preliminary examination is correct.
Then they use the IPC code(s) to determine the technical field(s) to be searched (Guide-
lines for Patent Examination of SIPO, Part II, Chapter 7, Article 5.3.2, 201011). Next, they
use expressions from the claims, such as the key words or chemical structural formulas,
to narrow down the range of comparing documents (Guidelines for Patent Examination of
SIPO, Part II, Chapter 7, Article 5.4.2, 2010). Sometimes, they also need to search other
materials, such as non-patent literature (Guidelines for Patent Examination of SIPO, Part
II, Chapter 7, Article 6.2.4, 2010) to make informed decisions on whether the technolo-
gies described in patent applications are novel. Once the application fulfills the novelty
criterion, the examiners then decide its inventiveness and practical applicability.
Patent substantive examination focus on two parts of information, one is patent claims
which limit the scope of requested patent right; the other includes the abstract, description
and figures, which help to understand the technology. Examiners review the complete
patent application file to evaluate the patentability and authorize patent rights requested
by the claims. If an application does not conform to the three requirements of a qualified
patent, the examiners will require the applicant to revise it within a specific time limit
(usually four months). An application can go through up to two rounds of revision.
After the substantive examination, one of the following two results will be made: grant
and rejection. If an application, after being revised if required by the examiners, fulfills all
the requirements, it will receive a decision of grant. An authorized version of the granted
patent will be published and open to the public. The applicant will receive a certificate
of invention patent right and enjoys the patent right within the scope of the specified
claims. The right will last for up to 20 years, or until the patent holder stops paying the
11Source: http://www.cnipa.gov.cn/zhfwpt/zlsqzn/sczn2010eng.pdf. Last visited November
29th, 2018.
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annual fee. On the contrary, if an application does not fulfill the requirements of novelty,
inventiveness and practical applicability, even after two rounds of revision, it will receive
the decision of rejection. Moreover, if the patent application contains information against
the law (for example, invention of addictive drug-device), endangers public benefits (for
example, inventions that endanger public health) or seeks the patent right for items not
patentable12 will be directly rejected without any revision opportunities.
An application can also be withdrawn by the applicant any time after the application
is filed so that the process of patent examination is terminated. As aforementioned, if
an applicant does not request substantive examination within three years after filing the
patent application, the application will be deemed as withdrawn. Applications that fail
to enter the substantive examination process will be considered as open knowledge and
available to anyone. An applicant can also withdraw an application during the substantive
examination process by not responding to the examiners requests for revision. Therefore,
once an application enters the substantive examination process, there are three possible
outcomes for it, namely, grant, rejection or withdrawal.
Figure 2.4 shows the complete process of patent examination at SIPO. The process
consists of the preliminary examination stage and the substantive examination stage, dur-
ing each of which an application can be withdrawn thereby terminating the examination
process before reaching the decisions of grant or rejection.
12Patent Law of China, Article 25 (2008 Amendment): For any of the following, no patent right shall be
granted: 1) scientific discoveries; 2) rules and methods for mental activities; 3) methods for the diagnosis
or the treatment of diseases; 4) animal and plant varieties; 5) substances obtained by means of nuclear
transformation; and 6) the designs that are used primarily for the identification of patterns, colors or the
combination of the two on printed works. For processes that produce the products listed in item 4), a
patent may be granted in accordance with the provision of the law.
13Source: Liegsalz and Wagner (2013); the SIPO website: http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zhfwpt/zlsqzn/
zlsqspcxjs/, last visited July 25th, 2018.
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Figure 2.4: Process of Chinese Patent Examination for Invention Patent Application13
2.4 Statistic Description of Chinese Invention Patent
Ever since 1985 when the first version of the Patent Law of China was put in force,
the Chinese Patent System has been continuously developing in the past three decades.
Table 2.2 shows the annual statistic for invention patents at SIPO from 1985 to 2017.
According to this table, the number of annual invention patent applications requested for
substantive examination at SIPO exceeds 10,000 for the first time in 1993, and the number
exceeds 100,000 in 2003. SIPO started to accepted PCT applications since 1994, and the
number of PCT applications requested for substantive examination is higher than domestic
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patent applications from 1994 to 2001. In 2002, the number of Chinese domestic patent
application requested for substantive examinations exceeds PCT applications and the gap
increases year by year.
Figure 2.5: Annual Statistics of Patent Substantive Examination Outcomes for Invention
Patents at SIPO (1985–2017)14
Figure 2.5 shows the annual number of patent examination results for invention patents
at SIPO from 1985 to 2017. The number of granted patents exceeds rejected and with-
drawn patents in 1994. Moreover, the number of withdrawn patents is always higher than
rejected patents. Combined with Table 2.2, it shows the average duration of substantive
examination for different results. We can see that the average rejection duration is always
longer than grant duration since 1994. In general, the durations for all the three results
are getting shorter year by year. This probably reflects the learning effects of SIPO. When
the patent system first established in China, SIPO needed more time to adapt to the new
system, hence, it took longer to reach decisions for patent applications. Since the first
14Note: There are drops after year 2013, this is because patent examination process usually takes more
than three years at SIPO. Most of the applications which are submitted to SIPO after 2014 are still under
examination without any decisions have been made.
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amendment of the Patent Law in 1992, the Chinese patent examination system has been
gradually improved.
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Table 2.2: Statistics of Invention Patents at SIPO (1985–2017)
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Chapter 3
Literature review and Hypotheses
3.1 Literature Review
There are two branches of research which are relevant to the technological diversity and
patenting outcomes. One branch of literature focuses on theoretical studies of knowledge-
based technological diversity and innovation outcomes, represented by Fleming (2001).
This group of research defines innovation as a process of knowledge recombination (Nerkar,
2003; Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008; Strumsky and Lobo, 2015). They argue that there’s a
non-linear relationship between technological diversity and innovation outcomes measured
by the impact of grant patents (Fleming, 2001; Huang and Chen, 2010; Kim et al., 2016).
The other group of studies consists of practical research focusing on the patent exami-
nation processes at global major patent offices. They summarize a list of patent attributes,
such as number of inventors, number of claims, applicant types, and so on, focusing on the
relationships between those attributes and patent examination outcomes (Lerner, 1994;
Popp et al., 2004; Van Zeebroeck, 2007; Xie and Giles, 2011; Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013).
This group of research tries to find out how different factors influence patent examination
outcomes – grant, rejection and withdrawal – differently (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Tong
et al., 2018).
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Notably, both streams of literature have found that the number of claims included in a
patent have significant impacts on patent examination outcomes. However, so far no study
has explained how these two patent attributes affect the outcomes together.
3.1.1 Innovation as Knowledge-based Technological Recombina-
tion
It is widely accepted that knowledge creation comes from recombination of existing
knowledge (Fleming, 2001; Nerkar, 2003; Ahuja and Katila, 2004; Yayavaram and Ahuja,
2008). Also, knowledge recombination is a dynamic process whose output is implicitly
considered as a technological innovation (Quintane et al., 2011). Innovation arises from
diversity. Like the ecology where a variety of different species consist a community. And
the diversity of ecology takes into account the variation in the complexity of the biologi-
cal community including the number of niches and other ecological process (Odum, 1959;
MacArthur, 1965; Wikipedia contributors, 2018). When regarding the science and tech-
nology discipline as a community, the knowledge components inside the community can
be seen as different species. The diversity of the components influences the activities of
knowledge combination, therefore affects the characteristics of the invention.
The technological knowledge components within a specific technology field available
for recombination is finite (Ahuja and Katila, 2004), therefore, inventors still create new
inventions by exploiting and exploring knowledge from history and other technology fields
(Nerkar, 2003). Thus, technological components combined from other fields make the
current technical community diverse. Furthermore, if the new and existing components
combined in the invention are dominant equally, then breakthroughs are likely to come
out, as it is difficult to categorize the outcome into any of the existing technological fields
(Fleming, 2007).
However, the outcome of technological recombination is highly uncertain and unpre-
dictable (Van de Ven, 1986; Fleming, 2001, 2007). When creating inventions, inventors
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explore combinations with both unfamiliar and familiar individual components. Learn-
ing from unfamiliar knowledge components takes time and efforts for inventors. Also, the
inventing process is a trial and error process, whose outcomes are unpredictable. Even
combining familiar components requires inventors to learn from previous efforts and find
the best combination of those individual components; thus, it does not reduce invention
uncertainty by combining familiar components (Fleming, 2001). Fleming (2007) concludes
that combining new components and creating new combinations can lead to both break-
throughs and failures. Because both of the exploring processes create inventions from
nothing and the outcomes are always unpredictable. Verhoeven et al. (2016) later define
such new knowledge combination as ’novelty in knowledge origins’.
Since breakthroughs are barely achieved, we would like to ask, what kinds of techno-
logical combinations can reduce the innovation uncertainty and make invention creation
process more successful? Fleming (2001) finds that refinement of previously used com-
binations, which is a knowledge exploration process, reduces uncertainty. It is because
inventors can increase the awareness of the usefulness of specific combinatory relationships
by using them more than once. Thus, it is easier to capture the optimal combinations be-
tween individual components throughout the refinement process and increase the certainty
of inventing. For example, the evolution of the keyboard. Before the ’QWERTY’ layout
keyboard became dominant, inventor tried plenty combinations about the layout of keys,
such as mixing numeric and letter keys in the same row or rearrange different orders of the
letter keys like the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (Fleming, 2001). Finally, inventors found
that ’QWERTY’ arrangement was the most efficient way of typing on a typewriter. Such
refining of previous technological combinations generates new relationships between previ-
ously combined components and reduces the invention uncertainty (Alois, 1939; Silverman,
1999; Fleming, 2001).
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3.1.2 Technological Diversity and Innovation Performance
Considering invention as a process of knowledge combination, researchers ask how di-
verse the combined technological components should be to receive good innovation per-
formance? There are two groups of arguments on the relationships between technological
diversity and innovation performance. The first group claims that the more diverse the
combined technological components, the more innovative the resulting technologies. Refin-
ing existing technologies results in a high level of specialization, such in-depth exploitation
might limit inventor’s knowledge absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Fur-
thermore, an inventor who tends to use broader technological recombination across tech-
nological domains is more likely to generate inventions (Breschi et al., 2003; Gruber et al.,
2013). Although this group of literature proposes an idea that there is a linear relationship
between technological diversity and innovation performance, they do not illustrate to what
extent technological diversity should be to get the desired innovation performance.
Unlike the first stream of literature that claims a linear relationship between techno-
logical diversity and innovation performance, the second group argues that the outcomes
of technological recombination are always uncertain, thus, the relationship between tech-
nological diversity and innovation performance is non-linear (Fleming, 2001; Leten et al.,
2007; Huang and Chen, 2010; Kim et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016). Fleming (2001) explains
that as inventing is a process of trial and error, combining new technological components
can lead to both failure and breakthrough. This uncertainty makes the relationship be-
tween technological diversity and innovation outcomes a non-linear relationship. Leten
et al. (2007) later use EPO granted patent data and find an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between technological diversity and innovation performance at the firm level. They
confirm that there is an optimal technological diversity level for innovation performance.
Moreover, firms with high levels of technological diversity can decrease their innovation
performance. The reason is that although diverse technologies can offer opportunities
for cross-domain integration, a high level of diversification can bring about risks of lacking
sufficient capabilities and higher costs for coordination and integration (Leten et al., 2007).
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3.1.3 Technological Diversity and Patent Examination Outcomes
During the patent examination process, applications are always grouped into different
technology categories and then assigned to examiners specialized in relevant technology
domains. Thus, technology classification codes assigned to patents are excellent indica-
tors for technology domains they belong to. In addition, as all the patent applications
are categorized into at least one technology domain using one technology classification
code, researchers prefer to take advantages of technology classification codes to study the
technological diversity of a patent (Strumsky and Lobo, 2015).
Lerner (1994) first develops a proxy to measure patent technology scope using the
number of IPC codes assigned to a patent. If a patent is assigned with a specific IPC code,
then the technology scope for this patent is narrow. On the other hand, if a patent has
multiple IPC codes, the technical scope for the patent is broad.
Later on, researchers study how the number of IPC codes or technology classification
codes15 assigned to a patent affect patent examination outcomes. They assume that the
greater number of IPC codes assigned to a patent indicates a more complex invention, thus,
the more complex task for patent examination (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Van Zeebroeck,
2007; Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013). Patent examiners need to evaluate the patentability
of the applications by comparing with prior art from different technical fields. Based
on this assumption, researchers have hypothesized and empirically found that there is a
linear relationship between the number of IPC classifications and examination duration,
regardless of the decision types (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013;
Tong et al., 2018).
Notably, Harhoff and Wagner (2009) use generality and originality to evaluate the tech-
15There are at least two types of technology classification codes studied previously. One is IPC codes,
and the other is the United States Patent Classification (USPC) codes. IPC is a patent classification
system which is accepted internationally. USPC is mainly used in the U.S. patent system since 1899
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Patent_Classification, last visited October 3rd,
2018.)
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nological diversity using patent citation data. Generality refers to the extent to which a
patent contains technologies that can be used in a wide range of technology areas. Origi-
nality refers to the extent to which a patent is generated from a broad set of technologies.
They find that the higher generality, the shorter the duration for grant and longer for
withdrawal and rejection, because high generality means a high value of the patent and
applicants make more efforts to get grant results. Furthermore, the higher the original-
ity of a patent application, the longer time is required to examine it (regardless of the
outcomes), as it takes time for examiners to search and review from a large set of prior
art. This suggests a linear relationship between patent technological diversity and patent
examination durations.
Other than patent technological classifications, the number of patent claims can also
affect the technological performance of a patent (Tong and Frame, 1994). Patent claims
set the boundaries of patent rights (Harhoff and Wagner, 2006) as well as the technology
scope of the invention (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). Applicants intend to claim as
much rights as possible to describe their inventions fully. However, patent examiners may
require applicants to narrow the scope of patent protection and only keep the claims that
cover patentable technologies. Thus, on the one hand, the higher number of claims indicate
a broader scope of technology. On the other hand, it can also represent the complexity
of patent examination process (Popp et al., 2004; Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Liegsalz and
Wagner, 2013), because examiners need time to review all the claims and make decisions
on which ones should be kept. It is observed that a greater number of claims leads to
a longer patent examination duration, regardless of the outcomes (Harhoff and Wagner,
2009; Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013).
3.1.4 Information Processing and Decision-making
Information processing is a process that a processor, such as a computer, takes in
information and generate an output following specific procedures. Shannon (1949) first,
from the cognitive psychology perspective, explains information processing as an approach
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to understand human thinking, which is related to how people deal with the same type of
information as computers. In the information processing theory, the mind is treated as a
computer, which is responsible for analyzing information gathered from the environment.
After actively manipulating the information, there is an output generated which is stored in
the memory for future usage (Gray, 2010). Human beings use the processed information to
communicate with the environment or make decisions. Hence, researchers treat information
processing as a crucial aspect for decision-making (Saaty, 1990; Wu and Cavusgil, 2006;
Bettis-Outland, 2012).
Since information processing is an approach to dealing with information from the en-
vironment, information attributes can affect the process, thereby influencing the decision-
making of the information processor. There are two information attributes that have been
discussed. One is information ambiguity (Paul and Nazareth, 2010; Luippold and Kida,
2012; Bettis-Outland, 2012), the other is information complexity (Streufert, 1973; Iselin,
1989; Chewning Jr and Harrell, 1990; Hwang and Lin, 1999).
Information ambiguity arises from insufficiency and complexity of information (Luip-
pold and Kida, 2012; Bettis-Outland, 2012). Information sufficiency refers to the informa-
tion set that contains the necessary evidence for making a correct judgment. The more
sufficient information, the more accurate the decision is. However, information sufficiency
is different from information completeness; sometimes even if the information set contains
complete data, the necessary evidence for accurate decision-making can still be lacking,
as the complete information set does not necessarily represent all the relevant data for
decision-making (Luippold and Kida, 2012). Thus, information insufficiency causes ambi-
guity in making decisions. For example, when hiring an employee, a fancy and complete
resume does not guarantee the employment. Usually, the hiring manager also needs to
assess whether the candidate’s working experience is related to the job description or not.
If the candidate’s skill set does not fit the position, no matter how complete the resume
is, the candidate still cannot be hired.
Information complexity is also considered as information overload, which means that
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the amount of information exceeds the decision maker’s processing capability. Complex
information requires an extensive information processing to extract the most relevant infor-
mation for decision-making. Paul and Nazareth (2010) conduct experiments and find that
the complexity of input information slows down the individual’s decision-making process,
as well as group decisions. Later, Chewning Jr and Harrell (1990) use a decision-making ex-
periment to analyze the relationship between information overload and information usage
during the decision-making process. They find an inverted U-shaped relationship between
information usage and information load. When individuals are over-loaded with informa-
tion, they tend to use only a small portion of it which is relevant to decision-making. This
conclusion is based on the findings about information relevance and decision-making from
Streufert (1973). Streufert (1973)’s study suggests that irrelevant information increases
information searching, thus, slow down the decision-making process. Hence, increasing
the proportion of relevant information within a constant information set can help decision
makers to filter the noise contained in the information set and make proper decisions.
Our research builds on the previous research and contributes to understanding how
technological diversity affects patent examination durations that lead to different out-
comes (grant, rejection and withdrawal). We define technological diversity based on the
existing theory of knowledge recombination. We also consider patent claims’ effects on
the examination process as the claims contain technological information of a patent and
patent examiners make approval decisions mainly based on patent claims. Inspired by
the modelling method used by Harhoff and Wagner (2006), we estimate competing risks
hazard models (Fine and Gray, 1999) to find what factors can accelerate/decelerate the de-
cision making process of patent examiners, incorporating the insights from the information
processing literature.
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3.2 Hypotheses
3.2.1 Technological Diversity of Patent Applications and the Du-
ration of Examination
Technological novelty arises from a process of (re)combining existing and/or new tech-
nological components (Fleming, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). Research has shown
that which components (i.e., interdependent, distant, familiar, etc.) to combine has great
implications for the resulting technologies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004). One in-
teresting finding is that the diversity of the combined technological components seems to
have a non-linear relationship with impact or usefulness of resulting inventions (Leten et al.,
2007; Miller et al., 2007; Sampson, 2007). For example, using a dataset of the patents from
1,644 companies from 1985 to 1996, Miller et al. (2007) find that combining interdivisional
knowledge has the strongest positive effect on the impact of a patent than using intradivi-
sional knowledge or extraorganizational knowledge. This non-linear relationship between
technological diversity and innovation performance has also been found in other contexts.
At the firm level, Leten et al. (2007) point out that a diversified technological knowledge
base can offer opportunities for technological cross-fertilization, therefore more conducive
to creative technological inventions, however, a highly diversified technological portfolio
increases the costs to coordinate across and combine knowledge from different domains
and thereby dampening the innovation performance of an organization. In a similar vein,
Sampson (2007) examines the effects of firms’ alliance partners on their innovation perfor-
mance and find that a moderate level of technological diversity of a firm’s R&D alliance
partners contributes the most to the firm’s innovation.
We argue that such a non-linear relationship also exists at the patent level in the process
of patent examination: technological diversity of a patent application has an inverted-U
shaped relationship with the duration of patent examination. Patent examination is a
process of evaluating the patentability of each patent application, which ultimately leads
to a decision. During this process, an examiner evaluates the quality of a patent application
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using its technological information and makes the decision to either accept or reject it based
on certain criteria. In China, the three criteria are novelty, inventiveness, and practical
applicability (Article 22, Patent Law of China, 1985).
In this study, we argue that patents’ technological diversity can influence the speed
of examiners’ decision-making. If a patent application has a low level of technological
diversity, it means that the invention resides mainly in a few technological domains. The
elements combined in this application are likely drawn from a pool that can yield only very
limited number of potential combinations. Therefore, this application has a higher risk of
having been seen or being similar to a previous invention. In this case, the examiner
will have ambiguous information to evaluate its novelty and inventiveness. He/she will
have to compare the current application against many published others. He/she might
also have to return the application and require the applicant(s) to make it clearer on how
it is different from others, following the rule used in China that all patent applications
must be given at least one chance for revision before being rejected. Hence, the patent
examination process will be extended. On the other hand, if a patent application has a
higher level of technological diversity, it means that it draws on many different technological
domains (but with a clear focus on one domain) and combine elements from those diverse
domains together. The number of potential combinations that can be derived from many
technological domains are much greater than that from only a few domains. Consequently,
the chances that a patent application drawing on many technological domains has been
seen or is similar to others are much lower. Moreover, such an invention is less likely to
be regarded as obvious by the experts skilled in any of these domains, thereby fulfilling
the criterion of inventiveness more easily. The examiner, therefore, will experience less
ambiguity about the novelty and inventiveness of the patent application. The examination
process can be shortened, because the examiner will only need to evaluate its practical
applicability.
The relationship between technological diversity of a patent application and the dura-
tion of examination is not linear. A patent application with a very high level of techno-
logical diversity contains elements distributed evenly in many technological domains (for
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example, lack a clear focus on any domain). Such an application might take the examiner
long time to make the decision. Although high technological diversity increases the novelty
and inventiveness of a patent application and reduces the time that the examiner takes to
determine its novelty, it does not necessarily accelerate the patent examination process.
The examiners still need to dive into those different technological domains and investigate
whether the proposed invention is feasible and practical. An application that combines
a variety of technologies is likely to exceed the expertise of the assigned examiners, who
then will need to spend time studying by themselves or asking others for help to make an
informed judgment. His/her workload to examine the application will to a large extent
increases. Thus, we expect that, when a patents technological diversity is very high, the
examination duration will increase. Based on the analysis above, we reach to our first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Technological diversity of a patent application has an inverted-U-
shaped relationship with the duration of patent examination. The duration that leads to a
decision, either grant or rejection, is the shortest when a patent application has a moderate
level of technological diversity.
3.2.2 The Moderating Effect of Claims
Patent claims contain crucial information about how patent applications are different
from existing technologies, and they define the boundaries of rights patents enjoy once
granted. Patent examiners use claims as a source of information to classify applications
into various technological fields and evaluate the patentability of the applications. Their
decisions to a large extent rely on claims. They base their decisions (at least partially) on
whether the claimed rights can be supported by the description of the inventions applied
to be patented. According to the Guidelines for Patent Examination of SIPO (Part II,
Chapter 2, Article 3.2, 2010), patent claims should be supported by the description, clear
and concise.
It is inconclusive in the literature what quality of a patent its claims can demonstrate
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(Harhoff and Wagner, 2009). Some scholars have used the number of claims to capture
the complexity of a patent application (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009). Others have used the
length of the principal claim as a proxy of novelty of a patent application (Tong et al.,
2018). Still others have used the number of claims to measure the value of the property
rights granted to a patent (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).
In this study, we use the number of claims to capture the quality of writing of a patent
application, in another word, the degree to which the claims clearly and concisely describe
the invention. SIPO charges RMB 150 Yuan for each of the additional claims when the
number of claims exceeds 10. It means that the application costs for patents with more than
10 claims are higher than those with less than 10 claims. We construct a dummy variable
indicating whether a patent application contains any paid claims. Since the applications
with more than 10 claims incur higher costs, we assume that the underlying technological
inventions in those applications are very important to the applicants, who are eager to have
those technologies protected with IP rights as soon as possible. Therefore, applicants are
more likely to invest more efforts in the applications with more than 10 claims to ensure
they get through the examination process fast. As a result, these applications tend to be
written more clearly with less ambiguity or confusion.
Clear writing style of patent applications contain less ambiguous information that re-
quires patent examiners to spend a lot of time processing. When a patent application is
well written, it is easier for examiners to evaluate its novelty, inventiveness and practical
applicability. Specifically, for well written applications with too low technological diversity,
examiners can use claims to narrow down the prior art to compare with; similarly, for well
written applications with too high technological diversity, examiners can also use claims
to direct their effort to find relevant information to evaluate practical applicability. The
ambiguity inherent in the applications with too low or too high technological diversity
therefore can be attenuated if they are well written. This leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The number of claims moderates the relationships between patent
technological diversity and examination duration. For the patent applications that have
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more than 10 claims, the effect of technological diversity on the duration of examination
is weaker.
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Chapter 4
Methods
4.1 Data
We collect the bibliographic data of all invention patent applications published between
1985 and the end of 2017 from SIPO16. After removing the duplicated records, we obtain
a dataset of 6,916,439 patent invention applications grouped into 35 technology areas by
the main IPC code (Schmoch, 2008).
We choose the applications in the field of pharmaceuticals that have entered the stage
of substantive examination as our research sample. The reasons that we choose pharma-
ceutical applications are twofold. First, pharmaceutical products highly rely on complex
scientific and technological knowledge (Brusoni et al., 2005). Patenting activity is an
essential source of technological advantage in the pharmaceutical industry. Second, phar-
maceutical manufacturers need patent rights to protect their profits. All pharmaceutical
products including patented or generic ones can be put into the market as long as they
have the listing approvals from China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA). Therefore,
in order to get a monopolistic market share and prevent others’ imitation, pharmaceutical
16China Intellectual Property Right Net website: http://english.cnipr.com/. Last visited October
9th, 2018.
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manufacturers need and prefer to obtain patent rights even before they put the products
into the market. Thus, they should want to understand patent examination process better
in order to get patent rights as soon as possible.
We include only the applications that have entered substantive examination into our
risk set, because we believe that the starting date of substantive examination should be the
starting point of the duration until the final decisions are made, not the application date.
According to the Patent Law of China, the applicants must make a request of substan-
tive examination within three years after the application date; otherwise, the applications
would be regarded as withdrawn. This means that applications do not enter substantive
examination automatically, and that only those having experienced substantive examina-
tion can ultimately receive decisions of grant or rejection from SIPO. Given our research
question, it is more appropriate to only include those applications that have entered sub-
stantive examination stage, as only they are at the ’risk’ of being granted or rejected. We
are also aware that while applications are under substantive examination, the applicants
can still withdraw them, therefore, withdrawal should also be one of the potential outcomes
following substantive examination. Even though withdrawal of patent applications is not
our focus, as this is the decision of applicants rather than patent examiners, we still include
it into our competing risk hazard rate model to avoid biases when we test our hypotheses
(see below for more details).
Our final sample includes 283,884 patent applications (with the main IPC code as
A61K, but excluding A61K-008, see Schmoch (2008)). Out of these applications, 92,812
are granted, 19,630 are rejected, 47,305 are withdrawn and 124,137 are still pending at the
end of our observation period (December 31st, 2017).
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4.2 Analysis
4.2.1 Survival analysis
The pending applications at the end of our observation period represent right-censored
cases (Tuma, 1984). Without including them in the sample, the results would be biased.
Including the right-censored cases into our sample, we cannot use ordinary least square
regression to model the examination duration. Instead, we use survival analysis.
Survival analysis is used to analyze the expected duration of time starting from when
research objects enter the risk set until the event of interest occurs to them (for example,
exit the risk set). A basic concept is survival function defined as:
S(t) =P (T > t), t > 0 (4.1)
where T is a random variable that represents the duration, beginning at t0 (for example,
the time when a research object enters the risk set), until an event occurs (for example,
the object experiences the transition from (origin) state k to (destination) state j and
exits the risk set). Survival function defines the probability of that the duration until
an event occurs is at least t, and that the event occurs later than t (Brostro¨m, 2012).
From this perspective, survival analysis essentially analyzes the transition rate, namely
the probability of the change of state from k to j in a very short period of time from t to
t+ ∆t. As ∆t is increasingly closer to 0, the transition rate can be written as:
r(t) = lim
∆t→0
P (t ≤ T < t+ ∆t|T ≥ t)
∆t
, t > 0 (4.2)
In this study, we are interested in the rates of grant and rejection but include the
rate of withdrawal in the data analysis. When a patent application enters substantive
examination, it can face any of the three outcomes, and it will experience only one of them
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Figure 4.1: Competing Outcomes for Patent Applications under Substantive Examination
if any. In other words, the three outcomes are competing with one another. The process
that a patent application goes through once the substantive examination is requested (until
December 31st, 2017) is shown in Figure 4.1.
We use exponential hazard rate model to find out how the transition rates are dependent
on a set of covariates. Specifically, we are interested how patents’ technological diversity
and its interaction with the number of claims affect the transition rates to grant or rejection.
The higher the transition rates, the sooner the application receives a decision (Hansen,
1999). The exponential hazard rate model assumes that the duration variable T can be
described by an exponential distribution (Blossfeld et al., 2012) and takes the following
form:
r(t)i =r(t)
∗
i · exp(β1D2i + β2Di + β3D2iCi + β4DiCi) (4.3)
where r(t)i is the rate of decision of patent application i, t is the duration from the begin-
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ning of substantive examination until the decision is made about i, and r(t)∗i is the rate
of decision including the effects of all control variables. The effects of the independent
variables are shown in the rest of the equation. Di represents the level of technological
diversity of patent application i, Ci indicates whether the patent application i contains
more than 10 claims. Hypothesis 1 is supported if β1 < 0, and hypothesis 2 is supported
if β3 > 0.
4.2.2 Imputation of Missing Dates
To conduct survival analysis, it is important to identify the time point when each
research object enters and exits the risk set. In this study, the entering time of each
application into the risk set is the starting date of substantive examination and the exiting
time is the date a decision (grant or rejection) is made or the date when it is withdrawn.
Some of the records in our data do not have complete information about those dates,
mostly those applications that filed in late 1980s and early 1990s when data collection was
yet standardized. We take several measures to impute the missing dates.
We impute missing substantive examination dates for applications with decision dates
or with the legal status of under substantive examination17 from application dates and
publication dates following the steps below. First, if both the application date and the
publication date are available, we consider the publication date first, because the publica-
tion date is closer to substantive examination date than the application date. If the pub-
lication date is earlier than the decision date (the date of grant, rejection or withdrawal),
we use the publication date as the substantive examination date. If the publication date
is later than the decision date (which is likely to be an error, as it is rare, if not unlikely),
we set the substantive examination date as 18 months after the application date, because
substantive examination usually starts after an application is published 18 months after
17We do not impute missing substantive examination date for withdrawn applications because they
could be withdrawn before or after substantive examination was requested. As a result, we cannot conclude
whether those applications have actually entered the stage of substantive examination.
40
the filing date. Second, if only the application date is available, we also use the application
date plus 18 months as the substantive examination date.
We impute missing grant dates if we can infer that applications have been granted
patent rights. There are three possible situations. First, if an application has a waive date,
it means it has been granted. According to Patent Law of China, if applicants of granted
applications do not pay due fees within 2 months after receiving the notification of grant,
it is regarded that they waive the patent rights. In this case, we use the date two months
before the waive date as the grant date. Second, if there is a decision-made date (appears
in early applications before 1993), as well as a termination date (when the owner stops
paying renewal fee or when the patent reaches the maximum protection period specified
in the law) or a waive date, this application is likely to have been granted patent rights.
In this case, we use the decision-made date as the grant date. Third, if there is only a
termination date, the situation can be more complicated. If a substantive examination date
is available, we use the date plus 12 months as the grant date. It is because it normally
takes 6 to 18 months after the substantive examination starts and we use 12 months as
it is the mid-point of the range. If the substantive examination date is not available, but
the publication date is, then we use the publication date plus 12 months as the grant date
(as we have set the substantive examination date as the publication date for those cases).
Fourth, if neither the substantive examination date nor the publication date is available,
we set the grant date at 30 months after the application date (the substantive examination
date is set at 18 months after application date and the grant date is 12 months after the
imputed substantive examination date).
Finally, we impute missing rejection dates for the applications that can be inferred
having been rejected. These cases do not have the grant date, withdrawal date, waive
date, or termination date, but the decision-made date. We then code the decision-made
date as the rejection date.
41
4.3 Variables
4.3.1 Dependent Variables
Our dependent variable is the duration of patent examination in months. The starting
date is the date when an application enters substantive examination. The end date is the
date when an application is granted with patent rights, is rejected or is withdrawn by the
applicant(s).
4.3.2 Independent variables
Technological diversity. We keep the first four digits of the IPC code assigned to
each application. The first four digits include the section, class and subclass of a specific
IPC category. We calculate technological diversity of a patent application as following:
Technological Diversity =1− Σi( number of IPCi
total number of IPC
)2 (4.4)
where IPCi represents each unique IPC code assigned to an application. This index takes
into account not only the number of unique IPC’s, but also the distribution of the assigned
IPC’s. The higher the index, the more diversified technological elements are combined in
an invention.
Paid claims. We create this variable based on the total number of claims for each
application. It is a dummy variable that indicates weather a patent application contains
more than 10 claims. According to Chinese Patent Fees Schedule published by SIPO18,
applicants must pay, when filing the application, RMB150 Yuan for each additional claim
when the number exceeds 10. We use this variable to interact with technological diversity
18According to SIPO website: http://english.sipo.gov.cn/application/howtopct/200804/
t20080416_380500.html. Last visited August 9th, 2018.
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to examine its moderating effect on the relationship between technological diversity and
the duration of patent examination.
4.3.3 Control Variables
We include following control variables that might have significant effects on the duration
of patent examination.
The number of assigned IPC (No. of IPC). We control for the number of IPC
being assigned to an application. Prior research has used this variable as a proxy for the
complexity of examining an application and found that it can slow down the process of
examination at both EPO and SIPO (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Tong et al., 2018). Since
this variable as a skewed distribution, we include the logarithm form of this variable in our
data analysis in order to avoid the biases brought about by outliers.
Application assigned with one IPC (Single IPC). There are significant number
of applications that have assigned with only one IPC. In case there are some significant
unobservable differences between them and others, we include a dummy variable indicating
whether an application has only one IPC code into the analysis in order to reduce the
potential biases.
Application with one claim (Single claim). For the same reason mentioned above,
we also include another dummy variable indicating whether an application only has one
claim. We create a dummy variable to control the applications with only one claim.
Application filed by a business-academic alliance (Business X Academic).
We identified those applications that are filed by business companies together with aca-
demic institutes, such as universities or research institutes. Some studies have found that
the alliance with academic institutes can help firms to generate more inventions and in-
crease their innovativeness in biotechnology than those firms without such linkages (George
et al., 2002). This is because the collaboration between business companies and academic
institutes can pool scientific talents and business talents together and facilitate knowledge
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sharing. The resulting patent applications might be more innovative and of higher quality,
therefore faster to be granted and less likely to be rejected.
Application filed by one applicant (Single applicant). We control for the effect
of single applicant, be it is an organization or an individual. A single applicant enjoys full
patent rights if the application is granted but also assumes all the costs incurred by the
R&D activities and the patent application process. A single applicant has limited resources
(compared with multiple applicants), which might have implications for the quality of the
patent application, which in turn can affect the duration of examination process.
The number of inventors (Total inventors). The inventors do not necessarily the
same as the applicants of a patent. An inventor is an individual who contributes his/her
knowledge and expertise to an inventionn to be patented. It is widely accepted that inno-
vation arises from the combinations of existing knowledge elements stored in organizational
knowledge repositories (Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008; Nerkar, 2003). Knowledge workers
are one type of knowledge repositories. A group of inventors working together can facilitate
the combinations of different knowledge elements possessed by each of them. The more
inventors combining their knowledge, the more likely the innovativeness of the resulting
technological invention is high. We therefore expect the number of inventors might affect
the duration of patent examination. In our analysis, we include the logarithm form of this
variable due to its skewed distribution.
Application of an invention invented by one person (Single inventor). Given
that there are many applications that involve only one inventor (about 46%), we include
a dummy variable to control for the effect of single inventor.
Application filed by individuals (Individual applicant). In our dataset, we can
distinguish two different types of applicants. One is organizational applicant and the other
is individual applicant. It is less likely that individuals file patens for strategic reasons
than organizations. Hence, they may not care about the results of patent examination as
much as organizations. The investment into the invention is also likely different. All these
can potentially affect the duration of examination process.
44
Application filed through PCT (PCT application). Following Tong et al. (2018),
we create a dummy variable to indicate whether an application is filed through the PCT
route. Most (not all) of such applications are filed by foreign companies from overseas.
Due to the institutional delays (for example, time spent on looking for agents and on
translation documents) and the lack of knowledge about China’s patent system, those
applications might experience longer waiting time before they receive a decision.
Application filed through the Paris Convention (Paris Convention applica-
tion). Filing through the Paris Convention route is another way to obtain patent rights in
China. It takes a different process than the PCT route (for details, please refer to Section
2.2). We include a dummy variable indicating whether an application is filed through the
Paris Convention route. Since an application can be filed through PCT, or Paris Con-
vention route, or directly with SIPO, the estimated parameters of PCT application and
Paris Convention application essentially show the differences between these two application
routes with the direct filing (for example, the route taken by most Chinese applicants)
Application represented by patent agency (Patent agency). We include a
dummy variable to indicate if an application is represented by a patent agency. According
to the Chinese Patent Law, domestic applicants have the rights to decide whether to
use patent agencies. The establishment of the patent agency system accompanied the
development of the patent system in China. Patent agencies are organizations aiming to
provide professional service to patent applicants. They are responsible to help applicants
to write effective applications and to respond to patent examiners’ requests in a timely
manner. Therefore, we expect that a patent application represented by a patent agency
will wait shorter before it receives a decision from SIPO.
Chinese priority right. We separate international and domestic rights of priority. If
an application has been filed in other countries before being filed in China, it has a right
of priority of 12 months starting from the first filing date. It means that if granted, the
patented technology will be protected starting from the first filing date, rather than the
date of application in China. The effect of international priority can be controlled for by
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PCT application and Paris Convention application, as most of those applications enjoy
international rights of priority. Domestic applications can also have rights of priority if
applicants file subsequent applications on the same subjects within 12 months after the first
applications. The protection will start from the first filing date if patent rights are granted.
It is often a strategic decision made by applicants when they want to get the ongoing
inventions protected as early as possible. These inventions might be very important for
the applicants or so challenging that the R&D will take long. Given the potential strategic
importance of applications with national priority rights, the dummy variable indicating
whether an application has national priority right might have a significant effect on the
duration of examination. Therefore, we include it in our analysis.
Application with a request for early publication (Early publication request).
We include a dummy variable indicating whether an application is requested to be pub-
lished early. According to Chinese Patent Law, all applications will be published 18 months
after the application date on the condition that they passed the preliminary examination,
thereby entering the pool of prior art for subsequent applications. The substantive exam-
ination usually starts after applications are published. Early publication can trigger early
start of substantive examination. Early publication can be initiated only by applicants
request on the application date. Applicants request early publication often to block com-
petitors and/or to get the inventions protected as soon as possible (especially when the
technology is easily copied or improved by others). These applications might have some
characteristics that affect the length of examination duration.
Divisional application. According to the Implementation Regulation of Chinese
Patent Law, one patent application should contain only one invention. When a patent
application contains two or more inventions, the applicant will be requested to separate
them and to file an individual application for each of them. This is called divisional
applications. We expect that being requested to file a divisional application might increase
the examination duration as it breaks the process. Thus, we create a dummy variable to
indicate whether an application is a divisional application.
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Annual applications. At the system level, we control for the workload of Chinese
patent system measured by the number of filed applications per year from 1985 to 2017.
We include the logarithm form of this variable in the analysis due to its highly skewed
distribution.
Legal periods. Finally, we include historical time period dummies to control for fluc-
tuations in the environment surrounding the Chinese patent system as a result of historical,
institutional and organizational shifts, which can affect the examination duration. We di-
vide the time between April 1st, 1985 and December 31st, 2017 into five periods. The
first three periods are corresponding to the effective duration of the first three versions of
Patent Law: the first period is from April 1st, 1985 to December 31st, 1992, the second
is from January 1st, 1993 to June 30th, 2001, and the third is from July 1st, 2001 to
September 30th, 2009. We further divide the period after the fourth version of Patent Law
became effective (on October 1st, 2009) into two periods: before and after March 14th,
2011. The reason is on March 14th, 2011, the Chinese government released the 12th Five-
Year (2011 – 2015) Plan for the National Economic and Social Development19, in which
it proposed a goal of having 3.3 granted patents per 10,000 people. This was the first
time the government included number of granted patents per 10,000 people as an index
of national capability of invention and innovation. We expect this will not only cause a
drastic increase of the number of patent applications, but might also influence the patent
examination process. We include four time period dummies in our models, except for the
first period that serves as the reference category.
The definitions of all variables included in our statistic models and descriptive statistics
are presented in Table 4.1.
19Source,http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/1314.pdf.
Last visited October 9th, 2018.
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Table 4.1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
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Chapter 5
Results
5.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistic of Chinese pharmaceutical invention patent
applications from 1985 to 2017. It shows a few interesting patterns. First, the number of
pharmaceutical invention patent applications that enter into the substantive examination
process in general increases over years, especially after 2010, the increase is almost expo-
nential. Second, the proportion of Chinese applications fluctuates over time. When the
patent system was just established, most of the applications were filed from overseas, only
about 30% were domestic. It may suggest that the understanding of intellectual property
rights were lacking in China at that time and most of inventors did not know how to protect
their and others’ intellectual property rights by filing patent applications. The percentage
slowly increases as China’s patent system is developed until 1993 when the second version
of Patent Law took effect. After that, the percentage starts to decrease until 1999. The
decrease might be caused by the China’s joining in PCT in 1994 and large number of for-
eign applications flooded in through PCT. The percentage has been increasing since 1999,
reaching 99.72% at the end of 2017. This trend is coincident with the surge of the number
of Chinese applications in the last two decades. Third, the average technological diversity
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of the applications each year gradually increases over time and stabilized in the range of
0.35 – 0.43 after 2000. It might mean that the technologies in the pharmaceutical indus-
try grow increasingly more complex, but stop at a medium level, which seems to provide
support to our hypothesis 1.
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the three examination decisions. It shows that
the durations for grant decisions are mainly between 10 and 25 months, while the ones
for rejection are usually longer, which range from 20 to 36 months. Figure 5.2 shows the
distribution of the average durations for different decisions by year. In general, the average
durations for all the three decisions have a downward trend. It is noteworthy that the
durations for grant seem to decline the fastest, especially after 1993, and since then the
rejection pendency has been longer than those for grant.
50
Table 5.1: Statistic of Pharmaceutical Invention Patents at SIPO (1985 – 2017)
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Figure 5.1: Pooled Patent Substantive Examination Durations
Figure 5.2: Average Durations of Patent Substantive Examination by Filing Year
5.2 Plot of Survivor Functions
Figure 5.3 is a plot of survivor functions for the three competing events – grant, rejection
and withdrawal. The horizontal axis represents the duration since patent applications enter
the substantive examination process; and the vertical axis represents the proportion of
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applications. We can see that, at the origin point, the proportion of pending applications
(i.e., survivors) is 100%. It decreases while the proportion of applications that experience
a decision (i.e., deaths) increases. The proportion of granted application starts to increase
quickly after around 12 months and levels off after around 84 months at about 55%. It
means that applications start to be granted with patent rights 12 months after they enter
the substantive examination. The proportion of the granted increases as the waiting time
increases, but most of the applications being granted with patent rights receive the decision
before 84 months since the starting of the substantive examination. After 84 months, it is
rarely that an application will be granted with patent rights in pharmaceuticals. The trend
is to a large extent similar for the other two events. The proportion of rejected applications
increases after 24 months and levels off after 108 months at about 13%. It means that, in
general, to reject an application takes longer than to grant, and that the proportion of the
rejected is much lower than that of the granted. Finally, the proportion of the withdrawn
increases after 20 months and keeps constant after 96 months at 30%.
In sum, Figure 5.3 suggests that most of the patent applications in the pharmaceu-
ticals are ultimately granted, followed by the proportion of the withdrawn, and then the
rejected. The duration for the rejection seems to be the longest. It might be because patent
examiners are required to give applicants up to two chances to revise their applications
before making the rejection decisions. Finally, the proportion of pending cases drops to
0 after about 144 months under the substantive examination, meaning that by then all
applications should have experienced one of the three events.
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Figure 5.3: Survival Plot of Competing Events20
5.3 Results of Competing Risks Hazard Rate Models
Table 5.2 presents the correlation matrix of all the variables included in our analysis.
The correlations are in general quite low among variables. It suggests that our results are
not likely subject to any multicollinearity problem.
Tables 5.3 shows the estimated parameters of the competing risks hazard rate models
for the effects of covariates on the rates of three outcomes following patent examination
grant, rejection and withdrawal. Models 1 to 3 are on the rate of grant, Models 4 to 6 are
on the rate of rejection, and Model 7 is on the rate of withdrawal. In Model 1 and Model
4, we include only the control variables. In Model 2 and Model 5, we add technological
diversity and its squared term to test Hypothesis 1. In Model 3 and Model 6, we add the
dummy variable of paid claims and its interactions with technological diversity (including
both linear and squared terms) to test Hypothesis 2. Model 7 presents the full model for
the rate of withdrawal as a comparison with the other two outcomes that we are interested
in. The interpretation of the coefficients is intuitive. A positive coefficient means that an
20Survival plot is generated from R programming with package ’ggplot2’.
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increase in the corresponding variable is associated with a shorter examination duration,
which is equivalent to a faster decision-making process and a higher rate of the event in
question. Likewise, a negative coefficient indicates that an increase in the corresponding
variable slows down the decision-making process, and thus a lower rate of the event.
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Table 5.3: Results from Fine-Gray Competing Risks Regression Models
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01,
*** p <0.001.
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Model 2 of Table 5.3 shows that technological diversity has statistically significant effect
on the rate of grant. Both the linear and the squared terms of technological diversity are
highly significant (p < 0.001). The squared term is negative (coef. = -0.691), indicating
that the technological diversity has an inverted-U-shaped relationship to the rate of grant.
It means that a moderate level of technological diversity can help patent applications to
get granted sooner. Figure 5.4 visualizes this non-linear relationship. It shows that the
optimal level of technological diversity is about 0.45. As the level of technological diversity
increases from 0 to 0.45, the rate of grant increases by 13%21. As the level of technological
diversity further increases, the rate of grant decreases. When the level of technological
diversity reaches 0.89, which is the maximum value of our sample, the rate of grant is
almost the same as when the level of technological diversity is 0. This provides support
for Hypothesis 1.
Figure 5.4: Relationship between Grant Rate and Technological Diversity
21It is calculated by setting all continuous variables at mean, all dummy variables at 0, except for Single
applicant is set at 1. All interpretations of parameters in the rest of the results section are calculated in
the same way.
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We find similar results for the rate of rejection. In Model 5, the coefficient of the
squared term of technological diversity is -0.929 and statistically significant (p < 0.001). It
suggests that technological diversity has an inverted-U-shaped relationship with the rate
of rejection, which is shown in Figure 5.5. As the level of technological diversity increases,
the rate of rejection first increases and then decreases. The peak point is when the level
of technological diversity is around 0.25, at which the rate of rejection increases by 5%
compared with the cases when the level of technological diversity is 0. After reaching the
peak point, the rate of rejection drops fast, and when the level of technological diversity
reaches the maximum value, the rate of rejection decreases by about 30%. This result
provides further support for Hypothesis 1. Technological diversity has inverted-U-shaped
relationship with both the rates of grant and rejection; therefore, Hypothesis 1 is fully
supported.
Figure 5.5: Relationship between Rejection Rate and Technological Diversity
Model 3 shows the moderating effects of paid claims on the relationship between tech-
nological diversity and the rate of grant. Both interaction terms are significant. The
coefficient of the interaction between paid claims and the squared term of technological
59
diversity is 1.150 (p < 0.05). It suggests that when patent applications have more than
10 claims, the effect of technological diversity is significantly weakened (i.e., the curvature
of the relationship between technological diversity and the rate of grant is reduced, or less
curved). This is clearly shown in Figure 5.6. For applications with more than 10 claims,
technological diversity almost has no effect. As the level of technological diversity increases,
the rate of grant monotonically and slowly decreases, but only by less than 5% when it
reaches the maximum value. It seems that the effect of paid claims is so strong that it can
override that of technological diversity. However, for applications with less than 10 claims,
the effect of technological diversity persists. It still has an inverted-U-shaped relationship
with the rate of grant, and the effect seems to be even stronger. The peak point is still at
when the level of technological diversity is about 0.45, at which the rate of grant increases
by about 25%, compared with that when the level of technological diversity is 0. This
provides support for Hypothesis 2.
Figure 5.6: Moderating Effects of the Number of Claims on Grant Rate
It is noteworthy that the main effect of paid claims is positive (coef. = 0.436, p <
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0.001)22. This suggests that applications with more than 10 claims wait shorter to be
granted than those with less than 10 claims. This result seems to be consistent with our
assumption that patent applications with more than 10 claims contain technologies that
are more important to the applicants and therefore tend to be better written and less
confusing, which can help them go through the examination process faster.
In terms of the rate of rejection, we do not find significant moderating effects of paid
claims. In Model 6, the coefficients of the two interaction terms are only marginally
significant (p < 0.1), whereas the squared term of technological diversity remains negative
and significant (coef. = -0.748, p < 0.05). It suggests that the relationship between
technological diversity and the rate of rejection is not moderated by paid claims. Our
Hypothesis 2 is therefore only partially supported. Furthermore, similar to the rate of
grant, paid claims has a positive main effect on the rate of rejection. This means that
better written applications can in general accelerate patent examination process and reach
the decision faster, be it grant or rejection.
As a comparison, we include the full model for the rate of withdrawal. The results
are shown in Model 7. Interestingly, neither technological diversity nor paid claims has
significant effect on the rate of withdrawal. This is probably understandable, as withdrawal
is a decision made by applicants, which might follow very different logics than the decisions
made by patent examiners. The applicant-driven decision can be much more complicated
to make; it might involve factors such as strategic considerations, power structures within
applicant organizations, and quality of communication among applicants, inventors, and
with examiners.
22We also estimate the models without the interaction terms, the effect of paid claims is positive and
significant for both grant (coef. = 0.284, p < 0.001) and rejection (coef. = 0.288, p < 0.001).
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5.4 Effects of Control Variables
Other than the effects of independent variables, we also find some interesting results
of the control variables. First, we find that the type of patent applicants can influence
grant, rejection and withdrawal durations. For applications filed by individual applicants,
it takes longer time to receive the decision of rejections or to be withdrawn. For those filed
by business-academic collaborating applicants, the decision of grants is accelerated and the
other two decisions are decelerated. These results are consistent with Tong et al. (2018)’s
study using SIPO data. Second, we find that international patent applications in general
experience different examination durations compared with Chinese domestic applications.
Specifically, both PCT applications and applications through Paris Convention route have
longer durations for grant decisions. These results are also found in the studies using EPO
data and SIPO data (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Tong et al., 2018). Moreover, we also find
some results that are different from prior studies. For instance, PCT applications get with-
drawn sooner. This may be due to the high costs involved in the PCT application process.
International applicants pay not only the patent examination fees to SIPO, but also other
costs such as international delivery fees and the costs of using agencies. If the costs exceed
the benefits, applicants will quickly make decisions to withdraw their applications. Third,
we find that patent filing strategies can affect patent examination process as well. For
example, if the applicants file applications with the help of patent agencies, they will enjoy
faster decision-making, and less likely to withdraw their applications. Early publication
request will accelerate the patent examination processes for both grants and rejections.
If the applicants choose to file divisional applications, the patent examination duration
for grants will be longer as dividing a new application from the original one suspends the
examination process.
In summary, our Hypothesis 1 is supported by the competing risks hazard rate models.
Hypothesis 2, however, is only partially supported. We do find a moderating effect of paid
claims, but only on the rate of grant, and not on the rate of rejection. Other than the
effects of our key covariates, we also find some other interesting findings, some of which are
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consistent with the prior research, while others are different. The differences between our
results and those of prior research entail future research on patent examination durations.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Discussions
6.1 Summary of the Findings
Patent examination is a crucial process to evaluate the patentability of technological
inventions. Studying and understanding what affects the duration of patent examination
can offer important insights for both patent applicants and patent system designers. This
topic has attracted some research attention recently. There has been studies with a focus
on world’s major patent offices, such as USPTO (Xie and Giles, 2011), EPO (Harhoff and
Wagner, 2009) and SIPO (Tong et al., 2018). Most of these studies aim to find out what
factors can affect patent examination durations. They strive to depict a comprehensive
picture and include many factors such as attributes of applications, applicants, application
strategies and the surrounding environment. These studies are an excellent starting point
that informs us what can affect patent examination durations. However, we still lack a
deeper understanding of how patent examination duration is affected. In this study, we
take a step into that direction. We focus on one important feature of patent application
– technological diversity – and develop a theory about how it affects pendencies for both
grant and rejection decisions, by itself and in conjunction with the number of claims. Our
empirical analysis in general supports our theory.
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Using 283,884 pharmaceutical invention patent applications filed in China from 1985 to
2017, we find that there is an inverted-U-shaped relationship between patent technological
diversity and duration of patent examination regardless of the decision. This supports our
Hypothesis 1. The finding suggests that a moderate level of technological diversity can
help to accelerate decision-making in the process of patent examination, whereas a low
or a high level of technological diversity slows down the process. Our explanation is that
when technological diversity is moderate, it is less ambiguous for examiners to evaluate
the novelty and inventiveness of patent applications without too much work needed to
evaluate their practical applicability. This holds true for both outcomes of grant and
rejection. However, the effects of technological diversity also differ for the two outcomes
in a subtle way. The grant pendency is the shortest when technological diversity is about
0.45 (which is close to the mid-point of the data range), and it is about the same when
the technological diversity is 0 or 0.89 (the highest value in the sample). The rejection
pendency, however, is the shortest when technological diversity is about 0.25, but it is not
much different from when technological diversity is 0; it starts to increase as technological
diversity exceeds 0.25. This might be because for applications that are ultimately rejected,
the time saved by unambiguous novelty and inventiveness is canceled out by the time
spent on applicants’ revisions. Thus, the level of technological diversity of applications to
be rejected mostly reflects the amount of work that examiners need to do to evaluate their
practical applicability.
Moreover, we find that the effect of technological diversity on examination duration is
weakened when applications have more than 10 claims, but only for the decision of grant,
not for the decision of rejection. Our Hypothesis 2 is therefore only partially supported.
Based on our assumption that applications with more than 10 claims tend to be writ-
ten more clearly with less confusion, we proposed the mechanism that when applications
are well written, examiners will not need to rely on the level of technological diversity
to infer the novelty and inventiveness of the invention, therefore weakening the effect of
technological diversity on examination duration. However, this mechanism does not apply
for rejection. Being better written do not substitute the effect of technological diversity
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for rejection. Paid claims and technological diversity have separate effects on the rate of
rejection, both are significant. This result is surprising and currently we do not have a
reasonable explanation. We hope future research can solve this puzzle.
This study complements prior studies that have focused on patent grant rate at SIPO
(Yasong and Connor, 2008; Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013) by empirically analyzing three
competing outcomes following the substantive patent examination simultaneously. Com-
pared with prior studies that have studied these three outcomes (Harhoff and Wagner,
2009; Tong et al., 2018), this study zooms into two key features technological diversity
and the number of claims of patent applications, develops and tests a theory of how they
can affect the pendencies for different outcomes.
6.2 Practical Implications
The results of our research can offer strategic insights for both patent applicants and
patent administrations. For patent applicants, in order to have their applications to be
granted faster, it would be helpful to anchor their inventions in several technological fields
but with a clear focus on one or two of them in order to reach a moderate level of technolog-
ical diversity. Furthermore, a well-crafted application (indicated by whether applications
include paid claims) can help to shorten the examination duration, so much so that it
can override the effect of technological diversity. On the other hand, if applicants want
to extend the patent examination process (for example, to delay being rejected), it might
be helpful to have a complicated application that involves many different technological
elements. Moreover, applicants can also get insights from other factors identified in our
results that influence examination process. For example, collaborating with academic in-
stitutes can help accelerate grants and decelerate rejections; and using agency can help
accelerate the decision-making process in general.
For patent administrations, it is evident that when the number of applications increases
in the system, it will extend the examination process for each application, due to the limited
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capacity of examiners. Recruiting more qualified examiners is definite an option to reduce
applications’ processing time. Moreover, based on our results that more technologically
complex application increases the workload for examiners, thereby delaying the decisions,
we propose two suggestions to improve the examination efficiency. First, the number of
patent examiners assigned to each application should be based on the complexity of the
application. Second, examiners from different disciplines should form examination groups
to better handle applications involving technologies in different fields.
6.3 Limitations and Future Research
Our research has a few limitations, each of which can lead to a potentially fruitful
direction for future research. First, we cannot include all the factors that might have
influence on patent examination processes, given the limited information available in our
data. For example, it is conceivable that patent examiners’ experience may affect the
examination duration; however, this information is not available to us. Our understanding
of patent examination process will be further deepened if other researchers can collect
more data on other potential factors - such as the characteristics of examiners, the network
structure of the knowledge elements combined in an application (based on how they were
paired in the past), and the knowledge and relational structure of inventor teams - and
develop and test theories on how they can affect the patent examination process.
Second, our results are based only on pharmaceutical patent data at SIPO, therefore it
is still an open question that how well they can be generalized into other contexts, such as
other industries and other countries. Our understanding will benefit from future research
that compare our results with those found in other contexts.
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